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Iraq: Military and Paramilitary Forces — The Hashd al-Shaabi, the Counter-ISIS Fight, and Defense Spending

An extensive analysis of Iraq's security architecture, examining the co-existence of the regular Armed Forces, the state-integrated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF/Hashd al-Shaabi), and the Kurdish Peshmerga. It details the defense budget allocations, the financial networks of paramilitary groups, and the strategic geopolitical influences of the US and Iran.

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Iraq: Military and Paramilitary Forces — The Hashd al-Shaabi, the Counter-ISIS Fight, and Defense Spending

Security is the fundamental prerequisite for economic and financial development in modern Iraq. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Iraq’s security landscape has transitioned from a centralized, highly disciplined conventional army into a fragmented, multi-layered environment. Today, Iraq’s defense apparatus is characterized by the co-existence of three distinct armed structures: the regular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the state-integrated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi), and the semi-autonomous Kurdish Peshmerga. Managing, funding, and modernizing these parallel forces represents a massive fiscal challenge, consuming approximately 3.5% to 4% of the nation's GDP and playing a major role in the geopolitical tug-of-war between the United States and Iran.

These security developments are deeply intertwined with the country's broader financial and economic history. Furthermore, the defense sector's massive budgetary requirements directly impact Iraq: Government Structure, while affecting the country's overall economic future and reconstruction prospects.


1. The Post-2003 Dissolution and Rebuilding of the Regular Military

The modern Iraqi military was built from the ground up after the 2003 invasion. Under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order No. 2, issued by L. Paul Bremer in May 2003, the entire pre-existing Iraqi military establishment—comprising over 400,000 personnel—was dissolved. This decision is widely viewed by historians and security analysts as a major strategic error, as it instantly created a vast pool of trained, unemployed, and disaffected soldiers who subsequently joined the armed insurgency.

The rebuilding of the new Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was funded, trained, and equipped primarily by the United States and its coalition partners, costing over $20 billion in US security assistance alone:

  • The regular army was designed to focus on domestic counter-insurgency rather than external defense, resulting in a lack of heavy armor, advanced air defense networks, and independent air support capabilities.
  • The Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), also known as the Golden Division, emerged as the premier elite force. Highly trained by US Special Forces, the CTS was structured to remain strictly non-sectarian and professional, serving as the spearhead in major urban battles.
  • The 2014 Collapse: Despite years of training and billions of dollars in investment, the regular ISF suffered a near-total collapse in June 2014 when ISIS invaded northern Iraq. Structural corruption, sectarian division within the officer corps, and the presence of thousands of "ghost soldiers" (fictitious personnel whose salaries were pocketed by corrupt commanders) left the army unable to defend major urban centers, leading to the fall of Mosul.

Following this collapse, the regular ISF underwent significant restructuring, reclaiming its professional capacity during the grueling three-year urban campaign to liberate territory from ISIS, with the CTS leading the fight at a high human cost.


The collapse of the regular army in 2014 prompted a radical shift in Iraq's security architecture. In June 2014, as ISIS fighters advanced toward Baghdad, the preeminent Shiite spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a historic fatwa calling for Al-Jihad al-Kifa'i (defensive jihad) to defend the country.

This call led to the rapid mobilization of tens of thousands of volunteers, resulting in the creation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Hashd al-Shaabi.

+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|               The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)         |
|                                                             |
|   * Formed in 2014 following Ayatollah Sistani's fatwa      |
|   * Composed of ~60-70 distinct armed factions              |
|   * Formally integrated into state security in 2016 (Law 40)|
|   * Receives direct funding from the Iraqi Federal Budget   |
|   * Operates a growing commercial and real estate empire     |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+

While the PMF played a vital role in halting the ISIS advance and reclaiming territory, their emergence introduced major political and economic challenges:

  1. Factional Divisions: The PMF is not a monolithic force. It is composed of multiple factions, broadly divided into three main groups:
    • The State-aligned Factions: Loyal to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, closely cooperating with the regular military.
    • The Political/Khamenei-aligned Factions: Heavily supported and influenced by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including powerful groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr Organization.
    • The Sadrist Factions: Loyal to the nationalist Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr (Peace Companies/Saraya al-Salam).
  2. Formal Integration (The 2016 PMF Law): In November 2016, the Iraqi Parliament passed Law No. 40, formally recognizing the PMF as an official, independent branch of the Iraqi state security apparatus, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. This legislation provided PMF fighters with official salaries, pensions, and equipment identical to those of the regular military.
  3. The Economic Empire: Beyond state salaries, several Iran-aligned PMF factions have built extensive commercial empires. In 2022, the government approved the establishment of the Muhandis General Company (named after Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the PMF leader assassinated by the US in 2020), a state-funded holding company modeled on Iran's IRGC construction arm (Khatam al-Anbia). The Muhandis Company has been granted lucrative government contracts for land reclamation, housing development, and infrastructure construction, giving these paramilitary groups significant economic leverage and financial independence.

3. The Kurdish Peshmerga: The Northern Defense Apparatus

The Peshmerga are the official security forces of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region, with roots in the decades-long Kurdish struggle against the central government in Baghdad.

Party-Based Divisions

Unlike the regular Iraqi military, the Peshmerga forces remain structurally divided along political lines:

  • The KDP Units: Loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Barzani family.
  • The PUK Units: Loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by the Talabani family.
  • The Integration Struggle: Despite efforts by the Ministry of Peshmerga and pressure from Western allies (particularly the US, which provides financial assistance to pay Peshmerga salaries), unification into a single, apolitical force has faced significant resistance from the political leadership.

Cooperation and Conflict with Baghdad

The Peshmerga played a critical role in securing northern borders during the anti-ISIS campaign, often expanding their territory into disputed areas, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. However, following the KRG's unilateral independence referendum in September 2017, federal forces and PMF units launched a swift military operation to reclaim Kirkuk and other disputed territories, restoring federal control over key northern oil fields and reducing the KRG's physical territory back to its pre-2014 borders. This shift is a key driver of the ongoing Iraq: Government Structure between Erbil and Baghdad.


4. Defense Spending and Security Finance Analysis

Maintaining three parallel armed structures—the ISF (comprising the Army, Federal Police, and CTS), the PMF, and the Peshmerga—represents an immense financial burden on the Iraqi state.

Military and Paramilitary Personnel Estimates:
+---------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
|               Security Branch         |         Estimated Personnel        |
+---------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| * Iraqi Armed Forces (Regular ISF)    | ~250,000 - 300,000 active duty     |
| * Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)   | ~160,000 - 230,000 active duty     |
| * Kurdish Peshmerga                   | ~150,000 - 180,000 active duty     |
+---------------------------------------+------------------------------------+

Combined with the Ministry of Interior’s domestic security forces (police, border guards), Iraq’s security sector employs over 1 million personnel, making it one of the largest employers in the country.

Budgetary Impact

In the 2023–2025 federal budget, the defense and security sector is allocated approximately 20% to 25% of total state spending, translating to billions of dollars annually:

  • Salary-Heavy Budgets: The vast majority of these funds go toward salaries, pensions, and medical benefits, leaving minimal allocations for capital procurement, research, and modernization.
  • Procurement and Corruption: Defense procurement has historically been a major source of state corruption. High-profile scandals have involved the purchase of defective military equipment (such as the infamous "ADE 651" fake bomb detectors) and inflated contracts for spare parts and logistics.
  • Foreign Military Sales (FMS): Iraq remains heavily dependent on foreign partners for advanced military equipment. The regular military operates US-manufactured F-16 fighter jets, M1 Abrams tanks, and various helicopter fleets, which require ongoing US maintenance contracts and technical assistance funded via FMS channels.

5. Geopolitics: The US-Iran Security Tug-of-War

Iraq's security forces are caught in a geopolitical struggle between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both nations maintain a physical security presence in Iraq and exert influence over different branches of the security apparatus.

The United States Presence

The US military maintains a presence of approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), focused on training, advising, and providing logistical support to the regular ISF and the CTS in the counter-ISIS fight.

This presence has faced intense political opposition:

  • Following the 2020 US drone strike that killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and PMF Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis near Baghdad Airport, the Iraqi Parliament passed a non-binding resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops.
  • Bilateral negotiations are ongoing to transition the coalition presence into a structured, long-term bilateral security relationship.

The Iranian Influence

Iran exerts influence through its close ties to the dominant factions within the PMF. The IRGC’s Quds Force provides these groups with intelligence, tactical training, and advanced weapons, including rocket systems and attack drones.

                                  +---------------------+
                                  |   Sovereignty &     |
                                  |   Economic Growth   |
                                  +---------------------+
                                     ^               ^
                    Regular Military |               | PMF Factions
                    & US Security    |               | & Iranian
                    Assistance       |               | Support
                                     v               v
                                  +---------------------+
                                  |  Iraq Security Arena|
                                  +---------------------+

This dual alignment creates friction:

  • Security Incidents: Factions within the PMF have repeatedly launched drone and rocket attacks against US military installations in Iraq and neighboring Syria.
  • Sovereignty Violations: The central government in Baghdad struggles to control these factions, who operate with high autonomy and have occasionally deployed forces to intimidate state judicial and administrative institutions.
  • Economic Consequences: This ongoing volatility increases security costs, discourages foreign direct investment, and complicates relations with international financial institutions, which view Iraq's internal security landscape as highly unstable.

6. Conclusion: The Challenge of Unifying the Monopoly on Violence

Iraq's security landscape is a reflection of its broader state-building challenges. The country successfully defeated the existential threat of ISIS, but the legacy of that fight is a fragmented security architecture with parallel military structures. To achieve long-term financial stability and attract foreign investment, Iraq must transition toward a unified security command. This requires integrating the PMF and Peshmerga into a professional, non-partisan military, and ending the political and commercial activities of armed factions. Without a state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, economic reconstruction and institutional reforms will remain vulnerable to internal conflict and regional geopolitical instability.