This article outlines the governance and institutional framework of Sudan, detailing the transition from a fragile civilian-military hybrid to a fragmented dictatorship. It examines the structure, Islamization, and catastrophic physical and digital collapse of the Central Bank of Sudan. Finally, it analyzes the breakdown of federal ministries and regional governance under the weight of the civil war.
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The governance and institutional framework of Sudan have undergone a catastrophic transformation, transitioning from a fragile civilian-military hybrid administration to a highly fragmented, conflict-driven military dictatorship. Historically, Sudan has struggled to build inclusive, stable state institutions, experiencing a cycle of short-lived democratic experiments, military coups, and centralized authoritarian regimes since gaining independence in 1956. The modern governance structure was deeply shaped by the three-decade rule of Omar al-Bashir, who established a highly centralized state apparatus that concentrated political power and financial resources in Khartoum while marginalizing the country's diverse peripheries.
The outbreak of the civil war in April 2023 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) did not merely disrupt this governance structure; it caused the near-complete destruction of the state's administrative, regulatory, and financial institutions. Assessing Sudan’s government structure requires an analysis of the failed 2019 transition, the subsequent military coups, the regulatory role and collapse of the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS), the disintegration of federal and state administrative ministries, and the profound international isolation that has crippled the country's public finances.
The modern struggle for Sudanese statehood reached a pivotal moment in April 2019, when a massive popular uprising led to the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir. Following months of intense negotiations between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian political groups—and the military leadership, a Constitutional Declaration was signed in August 2019. This document established a unique, transitional power-sharing framework designed to guide Sudan toward democratic elections over a 39-month period.
The core of this transitional structure was the Sovereignty Council, a joint civilian-military body that functioned as the collective head of state. The Sovereignty Council was designed to be led by a military officer for the first 21 months, followed by a civilian member for the remaining 18 months. Alongside the Council, a civilian cabinet led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was established to manage day-to-day administrative affairs, implement economic reforms, and restore international relations.
However, this hybrid governance structure was plagued by deep structural tensions. The military members of the Sovereignty Council, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of the RSF, consistently undermined the civilian cabinet, maintaining control over the country's security apparatus, foreign policy, and lucrative military-commercial enterprises. This systemic friction prevented the implementation of key institutional reforms and set the stage for subsequent governance crises, leaving the civilian cabinet powerless and unable to manage the country's pressing economic future.
The fragile power-sharing arrangement of the transitional period came to an abrupt end on October 25, 2021. Just weeks before the military was scheduled to hand over the leadership of the Sovereignty Council to a civilian member, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) staged a joint military coup. General al-Burhan dissolved the Sovereignty Council, suspended key articles of the Constitutional Declaration, arrested Prime Minister Hamdok and several civilian cabinet ministers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency.
Following the coup, the military established a de facto Joint Military Council, which assumed absolute control over the state's legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Although Prime Minister Hamdok was briefly reinstated in November 2021 under a highly controversial agreement, he resigned in January 2022 due to widespread popular protests and the military's refusal to allow independent civilian governance.
The post-coup governance model was characterized by a division of state resources and institutions between the SAF and the RSF. While the SAF maintained control over traditional state ministries, the judiciary, and the diplomatic corps, the RSF expanded its control over key economic sectors, particularly gold mining and border security. This joint military dictatorship lacked any domestic or international legitimacy, and its internal rivalries eventually led to the outbreak of the 2023 civil war, which destroyed the very state apparatus the military sought to control.
The Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) has historically served as the cornerstone of the country's financial and monetary regulatory framework. Established in 1960, the CBOS was tasked with issuing the national currency, formulating monetary policy, regulating the banking sector, and managing the state's foreign exchange reserves. A defining feature of the CBOS's regulatory structure was the complete Islamization of the banking system, mandated in 1990. Under this framework, all financial institutions in Sudan were required to operate under Sharia-compliant principles, eliminating conventional interest rates and utilizing profit-sharing instruments. The CBOS established an independent Higher Shari'a Supervisory Board to ensure that all financial products and central bank regulations complied with Islamic jurisprudence, a structure that significantly influenced Sudan’s financial history.
The outbreak of the 2023 civil war caused the near-complete collapse of the CBOS as a functioning regulatory authority. Khartoum, the historical center of the country’s financial power, became a primary battleground, and the physical headquarters of the CBOS experienced systemic looting, burning, and destruction. This resulted in the physical loss of cash reserves, gold bullion, and critical administrative and transactional records.
The digital clearing systems of the CBOS, which managed electronic payments and interbank transactions, suffered catastrophic disruptions, cutting off commercial banks and the public from their funds. In response to the insecurity in Khartoum, the CBOS leadership relocated its administrative operations to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, which became the de facto administrative capital for SAF-aligned government entities.
However, this relocation has severely limited the CBOS's regulatory reach. While the bank attempts to manage monetary policy from Port Sudan, it has lost control over financial institutions and branches in RSF-controlled territories, leading to a fragmented financial system. In areas held by the RSF, the formal banking sector has ceased to function, replaced by informal trade networks, parallel exchange rates, and the use of gold and foreign currencies. The CBOS's inability to execute monetary policy, enforce reserve requirements, or stabilize the collapsing Sudanese Pound has left the country without a functional monetary authority, severely complicating any future recovery efforts.
The physical devastation of the 2023 war has led to the systemic destruction of Sudan's government ministries and administrative infrastructure. Khartoum, which housed almost all federal ministries, directorates, and regulatory bodies, has been transformed into a conflict zone, with state buildings occupied by military forces or reduced to rubble. This physical destruction has caused a complete breakdown in the government's ability to provide public services, collect taxes, or regulate economic activity.
The breakdown of key administrative institutions has been profound:
This institutional destruction has created a vacuum of authority, allowing armed militias and local warlords to replace formal administrative structures with predatory informal arrangements.
Historically, Sudan has been structured as a federal republic, divided into 18 states (wilayat), each led by an appointed governor and a state cabinet. This federal structure was designed to decentralize administrative power and manage the country's vast geographic and ethnic diversity. Under the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), the transitional government attempted to reform this system by granting special autonomy and self-governance rights to historically marginalized regions, particularly Darfur and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.
However, the federal system was severely weakened by the central government's fiscal dominance and its refusal to transfer adequate resources to the states, a structural imbalance that contributed to the secession of South Sudan in 2011. The current civil war has completely shattered this federal structure, replacing it with deep regional fragmentation.
The authority of the central government in Port Sudan is largely limited to eastern and northern Sudan, while Darfur, Kordofan, and parts of Khartoum are controlled by the RSF or local ethnic militias. In Darfur, the regional government led by Minni Minawi has struggled to maintain administrative control, and the region has descended into localized conflict and humanitarian disaster. The breakdown of federal fiscal transfers has forced individual states to become self-funding, leading to the rise of localized taxation, checkpoint levies, and smuggling fees, which are captured by regional armed groups rather than the state treasury.
The collapse of Sudan's governance institutions has been exacerbated by deep international isolation. Following the October 2021 military coup, the international community responded with immediate and severe financial penalties. The United States, the European Union, and individual bilateral donors suspended hundreds of millions of dollars in non-humanitarian development assistance, which had been critical to stabilizing the transitional government's budget.
The impact on Sudan's sovereign debt and financial relations was catastrophic:
This fiscal suffocation has left the SAF-aligned government in Port Sudan and the RSF in the west heavily dependent on informal, illicit sources of revenue, such as gold smuggling, to finance their operations. This isolation has intensified the country's humanitarian crisis and made long-term reconstruction challenges almost impossible to address without a fundamental change in the country's political leadership.
Sudan's government structure is in a state of advanced disintegration. The failure of the 2019 democratic transition and the subsequent military coups have dismantled the fragile institutions of statehood, replacing them with a fragmented network of military control. The collapse of the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) and federal ministries has eliminated the state's capacity to regulate the economy, manage monetary policy, or provide basic public services to its citizens. The federal system has been replaced by localized warlordism, and international isolation has deprived the country of the resources needed to prevent complete economic collapse. Rebuilding Sudan's governance framework will require more than just a peace agreement between military commanders; it will demand a comprehensive process of institutional reconstruction, a return to civilian-led administration, and the restoration of international financial relations to ensure that Sudan can rebuild a functional, stable state.